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BROADNAX V. GONZALEZ: QUESTIONING
THE IMPACT OF EXPANDING FETAL
RIGHTS ON LITIGATION AND
HEALTHCARE IN NEW YORK
Elizabeth Lemanowicz∗
INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to imagine the anguish Marta Tebbutt faced on
September 6, 1980, as she gave birth to a child she knew had died
inside her.1 Postmortem examination of the fetus revealed that a
negligently-performed amniocentesis, a test in which Marta’s
doctor inserted a syringe into her lower abdomen in order to draw
fluid from the amniotic fluid around the fetus, had possibly caused
the fetus’s subsequent death.2 Marta turned to the courts for justice,
suing her doctor and seeking to recover for her “pain, severe
disappointment, anxiety, despondency, bitterness, and suffering.”3
However, for Marta Tebbutt, relief was never granted.4 The trial
court granted a motion by the defendant doctor for summary
judgment, dismissing the complaint as insufficient as a matter of
∗

Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2006; B.A. in Justice, American
University, 2002. The author would like to thank her family and friends for their
love and support, especially Damon Osborne, who was infinitely helpful and
patient during the entire writing process. She would also like to thank the staff
and editors of the Journal of Law and Policy for all their hard work and help.
1
Tebbutt v. Virostek, 477 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
2
Id. See also Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (N.Y. 1985)
(describing the amniocentesis that Dr. Virostek administered to Marta Tebbutt)
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
3
Tebbutt, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
4
Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143 (affirming the trial court’s order granting
defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint).
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law.5 The appellate court affirmed the motion to dismiss,6 and
finally, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the motion as
well.7 The courts reasoned that Marta had not suffered any
physical injury that would give rise to a claim for emotional
distress as a result of the stillborn birth.8 Without an independent
physical injury, Marta had no legal right to recovery for her
emotional injuries, and this would be the case for similarly situated
women for years to come.
The legal impediments faced by women such as Marta Tebbutt
were lifted in 2004 when the New York Court of Appeals decided
the landmark case of Broadnax v. Gonzalez, holding that, “even in
the absence of an independent injury, medical malpractice
resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth should be construed as a
violation of a duty of care to the expectant mother, entitling her to
damages for emotional distress.”9 Broadnax marked the end of
nearly twenty years of precedent that denied mothers damages for
emotional distress suffered from negligently caused miscarriages
or stillbirths unless they had experienced independent injuries.10
5

Tebbutt, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
Id. at 779.
7
Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143.
8
Tebbutt, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78; Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143-44. The
court noted that Marta Tebbutt alleged no physical injury distinct from that
suffered by the fetus. Id. Having suffered no physical injury, the court held that
Marta Tebbutt’s claim was governed by Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386
(N.Y. 1980), in which the mother sought to recover for emotional injuries
resulting from the harm done to her child in the womb. Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at
1143. Because the mother in Vaccaro did not learn of the harm done to the fetus
until the birth, which occurred some time after the harm occurred, the court
rejected the contention that the defendants owed a duty to the mother. Id.
Similarly, in Tebbutt, the court rejected the mother’s claim for damages for
emotional distress. Id.
9
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 649 (N.Y. 2004).
10
Id. at 648. Accord Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985). In
general, when there is a duty owed to a plaintiff by a defendant, a breach of that
duty that results in emotional injury is compensable even though no physical
injury occurred, but only if the breach “unreasonably endangered plaintiff’s
physical safety.” 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d § 2:284, at 1476 (2005). However, in
Broadnax, the Court of Appeals held that an expectant mother may recover
damages for emotional distress resulting from a stillbirth or miscarriage that was
6
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This comment analyzes the impact of Broadnax in New York.
The focus of the analysis is two-pronged. The first prong focuses
on the potential impact of the Broadnax decision on the future of
wrongful death suits for fetuses in New York.11 The second prong
focuses on the potential effect the decision will have on the
availability and cost of gynecological services in New York and,
consequently, on the rate of malpractice liability for obstetricians
and gynecologists. This comment argues that Broadnax could open
the door for a cause of action for wrongful fetal death, which is
presently prohibited as a cause of action in New York courts. By
reconsidering and expanding the rights of the mother and the fetus
in cases of prenatal malpractice, it is conceivable that mothers and
fetuses in the post-Broadnax era will be able to further push the
boundaries of tort law and claim new causes of action grounded in
wrongful death. This may be a substantial step in tort law, and
perhaps it is theoretically just; however, it is yet unknown whether
the liability that medical practitioners face will increase if a
previously unrecognized class of plaintiffs—unborn fetuses and
expectant mothers—are afforded significant legal rights.12 Indeed,
the Broadnax decision may prove detrimental to society if, as a
result of increasing liability for physicians, the provision of
healthcare becomes sufficiently expensive to compel the exit of
physicians from the fields of obstetrics and gynecology due to high
caused by medical malpractice, regardless of whether the mother suffered an
independent physical injury or whether her physical safety was unreasonably
endangered. Id. The Broadnax decision appears to have overruled decisions in
which recovery was denied for emotional distress resulting from a stillbirth or
miscarriage that was caused by medical malpractice in which the “independent
physical injury” was limited to the physical pain and suffering that naturally
accompanies the birthing process. 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d § 2:150, at 802 (2005).
11
An action for “wrongful death” is a “lawsuit brought on behalf of a
decedent’s survivors for their damages resulting from a tortious injury that
caused the decedent’s death.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1607 (7th ed. 1999).
New York’s wrongful death statute is set forth in N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS §
5-4.1 (2000). New York does not have a wrongful life statute.
12
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 650. “[T]here is no way for us to predict or
assess the potential effect of this expansion of liability . . . on the cost and
availability of gynecological and obstetrical services in New York State.” Id.
(Read, J., dissenting).
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insurance premiums and a fear of being sued.13
Part I.A of this comment provides an overview of case law
regarding tort-based causes of action for emotional or
psychological injuries. Part I.B chronicles the history in New York
of causes of action for emotional distress related to prenatal care,
including a discussion of Tebbutt v. Virostek, the precursor to the
Broadnax decision. Part I.C provides an analysis of the court’s
holding and rationale in Broadnax. Part II.A focuses on the
potential impact of Broadnax on wrongful death lawsuits in New
York. Specifically, it contends that the reasons previously cited by
the New York Court of Appeals for banning actions for the
wrongful death of a fetus have been effectively undercut by the
court’s decision in Broadnax. Part II.B briefly addresses the impact
of Broadnax on the malpractice jurisprudence of the past year. Part
III discusses the potential ramifications of Broadnax for the
provision of obstetrical and gynecological care in New York.
Finally, this comment concludes that the state legislature, not the
judiciary, will need to take the lead if clarity and consistency is
ever to come to the area of tort jurisprudence that encompasses
fetal rights.
I. BROADNAX V. GONZALEZ: PAST AND PRESENT
In Broadnax v. Gonzalez,14 the New York Court of Appeals
overruled Tebbutt v. Virostek,15 which held that unless an
expectant mother suffered an independent physical injury, she had
no right to recover damages for emotional distress resulting from a
miscarriage or stillbirth.16 The Broadnax decision recognized that
medical malpractice resulting in a miscarriage or stillbirth
constituted a breach of duty to the expectant mother, and damages
for emotional distress arising out of that breach should be
13

Medical Liability: Hearing on H.R.5 and H.R.4280 Before the House
Committee on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Dr. Donald J. Palmisano, M.D., J.D., Immediate Past-President of
the American Medical Association) available at 2005 WL 408414 (F.D.C.H.).
14
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004).
15
Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985).
16
Id. See also 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d §2:280, at 1462-1463 (2005).
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recoverable, even absent physical injury.17 In overruling Tebbutt, a
case governed by the court’s earlier decision in Vaccaro v.
Squibb,18 the majority in Broadnax relied heavily on the language
and logic of the dissent in Tebbutt.19
A. A Brief History of Case Law Regarding Causes of Action for
Psychological Injuries
The issue of whether to permit causes of action for emotional
or psychic injuries absent independent physical injuries has been
treated differently by New York courts throughout history. For a
greater part of the twentieth century, New York courts insisted that
a plaintiff could not recover for emotional injuries absent a
physical injury.20 In 1961, the Court of Appeals fashioned a new
rule that permitted recovery for emotional injuries absent
immediate personal injury, but only if there was immediate fear or
threat of bodily harm to the plaintiff directly.21 In Battalla v. State,
an infant-plaintiff was placed in a chair lift at a state-run ski resort
by an employee who failed to properly secure the infant and lock

17

Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649; 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d § 2:280, at 1463 (2005).
Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that a mother
who was prescribed a toxic drug that rendered her child limbless at birth could
not recover for emotional and psychic harm absent an independent injury).
19
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648 (citing Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1144 (Jasen,
J., dissenting)); Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1149 (Kaye, J., dissenting). “On its own
terms, Tebbutt may make formal sense, but it created a logical gap in which the
fetus is consigned to a state of ‘juridical limbo.’ It is time to fill the gap. If the
fetus cannot bring suit, ‘it must follow in the eyes of the law that any injury here
was done to the mother.’” Id. (quoting language from the dissenting opinions in
Tebbutt).
20
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896) (holding
that a woman who miscarried as a result of being frightened by a team of horses
owned by railroad company did not have a cause of action, there being no
recovery available for mere fright absent immediate personal injury).
21
Battalla v. New York, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961) (holding that a cause
of action exists when a claimant alleges that she was negligently caused to suffer
emotional and psychological injuries with consequential physical injuries).
18
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the equipment.22 As a result, the infant became frightened and
hysterical while riding on the chair lift and suffered “severe
emotional and neurological disturbances with residual physical
manifestations.”23 Under the principle that “a wrong-doer is
responsible for the natural and proximate consequences of his
misconduct,”24 the court held that the claimant should have the
opportunity to prove that her emotional injuries, leading to her
subsequent physical injuries, were the proximate result of the
defendant’s negligence. Thus, after Battalla, contemporaneous or
consequential physical harm, coupled with psychological injuries,
was thought to provide an “index of reliability otherwise absent in
a claim for psychological trauma with only psychological
consequences.”25
From the Battalla decision developed the rule that “one may
have a cause of action for injuries sustained although precipitated
by a negligently induced mental trauma without physical
impact.”26 In 1969, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the
Battalla rule to cases in which the tortfeasor’s duty not to cause
physical injury did not apply to the claimant seeking damages for
emotional and subsequent physical distress.27 In Tobin v.
Grossman, a mother was in a neighbor’s home when she heard
brakes screeching outside.28 She ran outside to find her injured
child lying on the ground at the site of the accident.29 The court
held that the plaintiff-mother was barred from bringing a cause of
action for her mental and consequential physical injuries caused by
22

Id. at 729.
Id. The “residual physical manifestations” were not explained or clarified
in either the trial or appellate level decisions. See Battalla v. State, 184 N.Y.S.2d
1016 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1959); Battalla v. State, 200 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div.
1960).
24
Battalla, 176 N.E.2d. at 730 (quoting Ehrgott v. Mayor of City of N.Y.,
96 N.Y. 264, 281 (1884)).
25
Johnson v. New York, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592 (N.Y. 1975).
26
Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 420-21 (N.Y. 1969) (addressing the
issue of the possibility of recovery for physical injuries resulting from a purely
mental or psychological impact).
27
Id. at 419-20.
28
Id. at 419.
29
Id.
23
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shock and fear for her child.30 The principles espoused in Battalla
made clear that an individual could bring a cause of action for
injuries that caused psychological trauma and consequential
physical injuries, even absent contemporaneous physical impact.31
Yet in Tobin, the court held that a cause of action did not exist for
psychological harm sustained by a person as a result of someone
else’s injuries, regardless of whether a special relationship existed
between the two individuals or whether the emotionally injured
person was an eyewitness to the incident that resulted in harm to
the other.32
However, in 1975, New York extended the rule in Battalla to a
situation in which the defendant’s negligence caused neither
contemporaneous nor consequential physical harm to the
plaintiff.33 In Johnson v. State, the plaintiff suffered emotional
harm as a direct result of the negligence of a state hospital, which
falsely notified the plaintiff that her mother, a patient at the
hospital, had died.34 The plaintiff’s emotional injuries were
unaccompanied by any physical injury.35 The Court of Appeals
held that it was the hospital’s duty to responsibly advise the proper
next of kin of a patient’s death and that recovery for emotional
harm would be permitted by an individual subjected directly to a
tortious act, such as the negligent mishandling of a corpse or the
negligent false notification of death.36 Johnson clarified that
individuals may recover for emotional harm, even in the absence
of fear of physical injury, when they are subjected directly to the
negligence of a tortfeasor.37 For such recovery, however,
individuals must prove that any suffered psychological injuries are
genuine and substantial, and that these injuries were proximately
caused by the defendant’s conduct.38
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 420, 424.
Id. at 420-21.
Id. at 423-24.
Johnson v. New York, 334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 591.
Id.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
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B. Causes of Action for Psychological Injuries Caused by
Negligent Prenatal Care

The status of recovery for emotional suffering can be broken
down into four main rules: (1) where a tortfeasor causes physical
injury to another, the injured party can recover for the actual
physical injury and concurrent mental and emotional suffering
resulting from the wrongful act;39 (2) where a tortfeasor directly
causes the injured party to experience fear of physical injury as a
direct result of the tortious conduct, the party can recover for
psychic injuries absent physical impact;40 (3) where a tortfeasor
physically injures one party, recovery is denied for mental and
emotional injuries experienced by a third party as a result of the
physical injuries sustained by the first party; 41 but (4) where a
tortfeasor genuinely, substantially, and proximately causes
psychological injuries to the injured party, the injured party can
recover for the emotional harm, even in the absence of fear of
potential physical injury.42 These rules can be applied to cases of
medical malpractice in which a doctor’s negligence causes
physical injuries to a fetus, resulting in the miscarriage, stillbirth,
or permanent impairment of the child. Courts previously have
addressed such cases from the vantage point of the mother and
have examined whether a mother’s right to collect damages for
emotional distress resulting from the physical injuries sustained to
the fetus inside her is a situation consistent with any of the four
main rules.
In 1977, the New York Court of Appeals decided the case of
Howard v. Lecher, based on the third rule above, holding that a
parent who suffers psychological injuries as a result of a doctor’s
medical malpractice in treating a fetus cannot recover for such
damages.43 In Howard, the plaintiffs were the parents of a child
who died from Tay-Sachs disease, a progressive degenerative
39
40
41
42
43

Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896).
Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961).
Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969).
Johnson v. New York, 334 NE.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975).
Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977).
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disease that affects the nervous system and tends to appear more
often in children with parents of Eastern European Jewish
descent.44 The parents alleged that the doctor-defendant was
negligent in failing to properly perform or evaluate a genealogical
history of the parents, given his knowledge that the Howards were
both Eastern European Jews and that there was a high risk that the
fetus would be born with Tay-Sachs.45 The Howards claimed that,
had the doctor informed them of this risk, they would have chosen
to abort the fetus.46 The parents brought a cause of action to
recover from the defendant-doctor for the emotional and mental
distress they experienced from witnessing their child suffer and die
from such a devastating disease.47 In this case, the court held that
the parents were not made to suffer any physical or mental injury,
except for the pain in watching their child suffer from Tay-Sachs,
and that the doctor’s negligence was not the direct cause of the
child’s suffering from the disease.48 The court suggested that, even
in a case in which the negligent conduct of a doctor directly injured
a fetus but in no manner physically injured the parents, there could
be no recovery for the mental and emotional pain and suffering of
the parents.49 Thus, there could be no recovery for the mental and
emotional injuries experienced by the parents in Howard.50
In 1978, the court decided the case of Becker v. Schwartz based
on the principles espoused in Howard.51 In Becker, two cases were
combined in which the plaintiffs sought damages for emotional
distress alleged to have occurred as a consequence of the birth of
their infants in an impaired state, the birth of those infants having
occurred through the negligence of the defendant-doctors.52 In
Becker, the plaintiffs had received prenatal care from the

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Howard, 366 N.E.2d at 64-65, 67.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 64-65, 66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 809.
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defendant-doctors.53 Plaintiff-mother Delores Becker was thirtyseven years old at the time of her pregnancy and at no point during
the prenatal care provided by the defendant-doctors was Delores
informed that, based on her age, she was at an increased risk of
bearing a child with Down’s Syndrome.54 Becker subsequently
gave birth to an infant with Down’s Syndrome.55 Becker and her
husband claimed damages for the pecuniary expenses they bore
and would continue to bear for the care and treatment of their
infant, and for the emotional and physical injuries suffered by
Delores as a result of her child’s having been born with Down’s
Syndrome.56
In a companion case, Park v. Chessin, Hetty Park and her
husband consulted the defendant-doctors to determine the
likelihood that they would bear a child afflicted with a genetic
kidney disease.57 Having already experienced the birth of a child
who had died from a genetic kidney disease five hours after being
born, the plaintiffs were concerned with the possibility that they
might bear another child so afflicted.58 In response to the plaintiffs’
inquiry, the defendant-doctors told the Parks that the chances of
having another baby afflicted with the kidney disease were
“practically nil.”59 As a result of this information, the Parks
renewed their efforts to conceive a child and Hetty subsequently
gave birth to a baby born with a genetic kidney disease.60 The
infant survived for only two and a half years before dying from the
disease.61 Plaintiffs brought a claim seeking damages for the
pecuniary expenses they bore for the care and treatment of their
53

Id. at 808.
Id. at 808-09.
55
Id. at 808.
56
Id. at 809.
57
Id. Hetty Park had already given birth to a baby who died five hours after
birth from a polycystic kidney disease. Id. Based on their history, Hetty Park and
her husband were questioning whether the kidney disease was a geneticallycaused disease. Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
54
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infant prior to his death, and for the psychological and physical
injuries suffered by Hetty Park as the result of her child’s having
been born with a genetic kidney disease.62
The Becker court held that, while the parents might have a
valid claim for the pecuniary expenses they endured or would
continue to endure in providing care and treatment for their infants,
there could be no recovery by the plaintiff-mothers for the
psychological injuries they endured from having given birth to
impaired infants, based on the court’s decision in Howard.63
Furthermore, the court held that permitting the plaintiffs to recover
for pecuniary loss but precluding recovery for the emotional
injuries was consistent with the court’s decision in Johnson v.
State, in which the court sustained a cause of action for emotional
harm based on the plaintiff’s having been falsely informed by a
hospital that her mother had died.64 In Johnson, the court
recognized the existence of a duty by the hospital not to issue death
notices in a negligent manner; the breach of this duty entitled the
plaintiff to recover for harmful consequences proximately caused
by the breach, including pecuniary loss and emotional harm caused
by the tortious act.65 In distinguishing Johnson from Becker, the
court restated the Johnson rule, which limited the plaintiff’s
recovery to damages for the “proven harmful consequences
proximately caused by the breach.”66 The court explained that, in
Johnson, the causal nexus between the daughter’s emotional
injuries and the hospital’s breach was clear, but that the “same
cannot be confidently said with respect to the birth of a child, the
conception of which was planned and fully desired by the
parents.”67 While parents may suffer from psychological injuries
due to the birth of their child in an impaired state, the parents may
also “experience a love that even an abnormality cannot fully
dampen.”68 Thus, to assess an amount for emotional damages
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Id. at 813.
Id. (citing Johnson v. New York, 334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975)).
Id. at 814 (citing Johnson, 334 N.E.2d at 593).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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would require consideration of the “love” factor in mitigation of
the parents’ emotional injuries.69 The court noted that, unlike
Johnson, Becker required consideration of mitigating factors that
would complicate the calculation of damages for the plaintiffs’
emotional injuries—injuries that would ultimately prove too
speculative and uncertain to be deemed a “proven harmful
consequence proximately caused by the breach” of the defendantdoctors’ duties to the plaintiffs.70
Following Becker, in 1980, the Court of Appeals decided
Vaccaro v. Squibb.71 In that case, the plaintiff-mother, Inez
Vaccaro, was prescribed a hormone by her physician to prevent the
miscarriage of her baby, given that she had previously suffered a
stillbirth and a miscarriage.72 The drug caused Vaccaro’s infant to
be born with neither arms nor legs and with other serious injuries.73
Relevant to damages for emotional distress, the plaintiffs brought a
cause of action against the defendants, the physician and drug
manufacturer, for “damages for the injuries to their nervous
systems and emotional damage, personality changes and extreme
mental anguish occasioned by the birth of their daughter without
limbs and with other serious and permanent injuries and congenital
defects” due to the plaintiff-mother’s having ingested the
dangerous hormone during pregnancy.74 The trial court held that
the facts of Vaccaro were more like the facts in Johnson than
Howard because the plaintiffs in Vaccaro alleged that the infant’s
deformities were the direct result of exposure to a drug
administered to the mother by the mother’s physician during
pregnancy.75 The court noted that this was a direct harm to the
69

Id.
Id. Interestingly, the court here said that the legislature would be a better
body than the judiciary to determine whether emotional damages should be
permitted in cases in which the plaintiffs’ emotional injuries stemming from the
prenatal medical malpractice that led to the birth of their infants in an impaired
state might be mitigated by their love for the child. Id.
71
Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980).
72
Vaccaro v. Squibb, 412 N.Y.S.2d 722, 723 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 724.
75
Id. at 730.
70
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mother and father caused by the breach of a duty owed by the
defendants to the parents.76 Furthermore, the plaintiff-mother
actually ingested the hormone, and thus, there was a triable issue
of fact as to whether the psychological damages were the natural
consequences of the wrongful act.77 Thus, the trial court denied the
defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims for emotional
damages.78
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s holding in
Vaccaro,79 in part holding that Vaccaro was more like Johnson
than Tobin or Howard.80 The court explained that, in Vaccaro, a
duty of care was owed by the doctor-defendant to the mother who
ingested the hormone, as it was owed to the daughter falsely
informed of her mother’s death in Johnson.81 This duty derived
from the fact that the defendant-doctor was the mother’s physician,
knew of her prior stillbirth and miscarriage, and selected and
administered the hormone said to be responsible for the infant’s
deformities.82 Unlike Tobin, the plaintiff-mother in Vaccaro was
not a bystander; rather, the mother herself ingested the drug.83
Additionally, in contrast to Howard, in Vaccaro there was
“something more” than the failure to discuss with the parents the
risk of bearing a child with Tay-Sachs syndrome.84 While the
doctor in Howard had committed no affirmative acts or errors, the
doctor in Vaccaro had affirmatively administered to the plaintiffmother a drug that subsequently caused her infant to be born
impaired.85 Thus, the appellate level court held that the mother
could maintain a cause of action for emotional distress, premised
on the theory that she suffered from emotional harm directly

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id.
Id.
Vaccaro v. Squibb, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 681-82.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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caused by the breach of defendant-doctor’s duty to her.86 The
father’s cause of action for emotional distress was dismissed, as he
was not a patient of the doctor, did not ingest the drug, and thus,
was owed no duty, the breach of which would give rise to a
recovery.87
Despite the holdings of both the trial and appellate level courts,
the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff-mother’s cause of
action for emotional distress could not stand in Vaccaro.88 Citing
Howard and Becker, the majority dismissed the cause of action for
the plaintiff-mother’s emotional injuries because she did not set
forth evidence of any independent injuries.89 This brief but
steadfast application of Howard and Becker would set the stage for
the court’s decision in Tebbutt v. Virostek, the precedent case that
would not be overturned until Broadnax v. Gonzalez, almost
twenty years later.
In 1985, the Court of Appeals decided Tebbutt v. Virostek,90 in
which the alleged negligence of medical care providers directly
resulted in a fetus’s death in utero, although the mother suffered no
physical injuries distinct from the injuries to the fetus.91 In Tebbutt,
the plaintiff’s obstetrician attempted to perform an amniocentesis
three times with no success.92 Prior to the first attempted
amniocentesis, the fetal heart monitor showed the fetus to be viable
86

Id. at 683-84. The court held that “[t]here is a vital interest to be
protected, there is proximate cause, there is demonstrable injury and there is
foreseeability. ‘Thus, the rationale underlying the Tobin case, namely, the real
dangers of extending recovery for harm to others than those directly involved, is
inapplicable to the instant case.’” Id. (citing Johnson v. New York, 334 N.E.2d
590, 593 (N.Y. 1975)).
87
Id. at 684.
88
Vaccaro, 418 N.E.2d at 386.
89
Id.
90
Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985).
91
Id. at 1143. See also Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 647-48
(N.Y. 2004).
92
Tebbutt v. Virostek, 477 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984);
Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1144 (describing the amniocentesis that Dr. Virostek
administered to Marta Tebbutt) (Jasen, J., dissenting). An amniocentesis is a
procedure in which a syringe punctures the womb in order to draw fluid for
testing. Id.
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and of normal size for a sixteen-week gestation.93 More than a
month later, despite reassurances that the fetus was normal, the
plaintiff-mother delivered a stillborn baby, bearing three
hemorrhagic blisters, whose size was consistent with sixteen-week
gestation.94 Doctors concluded that it was possible that the failed
amniocentesis attempts caused the fetal death.95 In her claim to
recover for “pain, severe disappointment, anxiety, despondency,
bitterness, and suffering,”96 the plaintiff alleged no physical
injuries apart from those suffered by the fetus.97
The majority in Tebbutt rejected the plaintiff’s claim for
damages for emotional distress.98 The court succinctly explained
that the plaintiff’s claims for emotional damages must be denied
based on Vaccaro v. Squibb, which held that damages for
emotional distress may not be recovered by the parents of children
who are injured in utero but born alive.99 In Vaccaro, the court
“rejected the contention that the defendants owed any duty to the
mother” where the harm done to the child in utero was not
discovered until the birth of the child, some time after the damage
was done.100 Based on the logic of Vaccaro, the Tebbutt majority
rejected the mother’s claim for emotional distress damages.101
While the majority declared that the plaintiff-mother was not
owed a duty by her doctors, the dissent in Tebbutt expressed
considerable concern about the consequences of precluding
emotional distress claims by mothers of fetuses negligently killed
93

Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1144.
Id. at 1145.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1143, 1145.
97
Id. at 1143, 1145.
98
Id. at 1143.
99
Id. at 1144 (citing Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980)).
100
Id. at 1143 (citing Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980)).
101
Id. at 1143-44. Interestingly, in Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386, 387
n.* (N.Y. 1980), the dissenting judge reflected on the “stultifying effect of what
may be too indiscriminating an application of stare decisis.” In his dissent, the
judge stated that the defendants owed a duty directly to the mother as the patient
of the doctor and the consumer of the implicated drug (the patient had ingested a
prescription drug that caused deformities in her baby). Vaccaro, 418 N.E.2d at
387.
94
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in utero.102 The dissent explained that the majority had created a
“juridical limbo,” in which a physician’s negligent acts resulting in
the death of an unborn child would be “neither compensated nor
deterred.”103 The dissent concluded that a child killed in utero has
no rights under the law for two reasons: (1) for purposes of the
wrongful death statute, the stillborn child is not considered a
“person” who is owed a duty of care;104 and (2) under the Tebbutt
majority’s rationale, for the purposes of a personal injury action,
the stillborn child is not owed a duty of care.105 Under the
majority’s analysis, if the child in the case were born alive, a
remedy would exist;106 however, if the child were more seriously
injured, resulting in the child’s death, the loss would go
unredressed.107 The dissent thus concluded that “[w]here the law
declares that the stillborn child is not a person who can bring suit,
then it must follow in the eyes of the law that any injury here was
done to the mother.”108 According to the dissent’s logic, the mother
should have been able to bring a claim of emotional distress
resulting from the stillbirth of her child.
C. Broadnax v. Gonzalez
Tebbutt provided the New York courts with a precedent that
was strictly adhered to for nearly twenty years until two cases—
Broadnax v. Gonzalez109 and Fahey v. Canino110—percolated up
through the courts. At the trial level, the plaintiff-mothers sought
damages for emotional distress from their prenatal medical
102

Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1145 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1144.
104
Id. at 1148 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1149 (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951) (Kaye,
J., dissenting)).
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 759 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), rev’d,
809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004).
110
Fahey v. Canino, 758 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) rev’d sub
nom. Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004).
103
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caregivers based on malpractice that resulted in the deaths of the
fetuses carried by the mothers.111 In both cases, the courts granted
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, holding that the
plaintiff-mothers could not recover for emotional or psychological
injuries stemming from malpractice resulting in the death of an
unborn child.112 Subsequently, the plaintiffs in both cases
appealed; however, in both cases, the appellate court affirmed the
judgments of the trial court.113
In the early hours of September 24, 1994, Karen Broadnax,
pregnant and almost due to give birth, called her midwife to say
that her water had broken and that she was expelling blood.114 The
midwife told Karen and her husband to come to the birthing center,
but when Karen arrived just over an hour later, she was still
experiencing vaginal bleeding.115 The midwife consulted Karen’s
obstetrician, Dr. Gonzalez, who requested that Karen be
transferred to a hospital.116 Approximately forty-five minutes later,
Karen, her husband, and the midwife arrived at the hospital.117
Although Karen’s obstetrician still had not arrived, the midwife
failed to call or consult the on-call doctor at the hospital.118 When
Dr. Gonzalez arrived two hours later, the fetal heart rate had
already decelerated.119 However, instead of performing an
emergency cesarean section, Dr. Gonzalez conducted a number of
tests, including a vaginal and pelvic examination and a
sonogram.120 Half an hour later, Karen delivered a full-term
stillborn baby by cesarean section who, according to the autopsy,
had died from a placental abruption.121
111

Broadnax, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 500; Fahey v. Canino, No. 40038(U), slip
op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 5, 2002).
112
Broadnax, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 500; Fahey, slip op. at 5.
113
Broadnax, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 500; Fahey, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
114
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 646 (N.Y. 2004).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 647.
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Karen and her husband brought an action against Karen’s
obstetrician, the midwife, and the hospital to recover damages for
emotional distress resulting from the stillbirth of the baby.122 The
appellate level court held that Tebbutt v. Virostek precluded
mothers from “recovering damages for emotional or psychological
harm stemming from the stillbirth . . . [unless they had] suffered a
legally cognizable physical injury distinct from the fetus’s.”123
Given that Karen Broadnax failed to produce evidence of an
independent injury apart from those normally incident to
childbirth, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.124 The appellate court affirmed the
judgment.125 Applying Vaccaro and Tebbutt, the court rejected the
possibility of recovering emotional damages for a negligently
caused stillbirth, noting:
There is an absence of evidence that the plaintiff mother
suffered a physical injury distinct from the injury to her
unborn child and separate and apart from that which occurs
in any normal childbirth. Thus, she may not recover
damages for the psychological and emotional harm she
allegedly suffered as a result of the stillbirth of her child.126
Debra Ann Fahey and her husband experienced a loss similar
to that of the Broadnaxes. In August 1999, Debra Ann was told by
her obstetrician, Dr. Canino, that she was carrying twins.127 Two
months later at a regular checkup, Debra Ann informed Dr.
Canino’s partner, Dr. Ruggiero, that she was experiencing lower
back pain and cramping.128 Dr. Ruggiero performed an ultrasound
and concluded that one of the twins was pressed against Debra
Ann’s sciatic nerve, and that this was the source of her pain.129
Two days later, Debra Ann experienced increasingly intense pain
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id.
Id.
Broadnax, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
Id.
Id.
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 647.
Id.
Id.

BETH MACROED CORRECTED FINAL 060605.DOC

FETAL RIGHTS UNDER NEW YORK LAW

6/6/2005 1:37 PM

825

and nausea.130 She called Dr. Canino who, relying on Dr.
Ruggiero’s examination, suggested to Debra Ann the pain was
related to the sciatic nerve and that the nausea was probably related
to something she ate for lunch.131 Dr. Canino simply told Debra
Ann to lie down.132 While sitting on the toilet two hours later,
Debra Ann tragically gave birth to one of the twins.133 With the
umbilical cord from the first fetus still attached to her body, Debra
Ann was transported by ambulance to the hospital, where she
delivered the second twin.134 Neither twin lived.135 Debra Ann was
later diagnosed with an “incompetent cervix,”136 a problem that is
detectable by ultrasound and can be remedied with a surgical
procedure.137
The plaintiffs, Debra Ann and her husband, commenced a
medical malpractice action against the defendant-doctors for the
emotional distress caused by Debra Ann’s loss of the twins,
130

Id.
Id.
132
Id.
133
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 647.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. An incompetent cervix is a weakened cervix that predisposes a
woman to mid-term miscarriage or early (premature) delivery. Special Care
Pregnancies: Incompetent Cervix, University of Pennsylvania Health System, at
http://www.pennhealth.com/health_info/pregnancy/specialcare/articles/cervix/%
20html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Special Care Pregnancies].
137
If a doctor suspects that a woman might have an incompetent cervix, she
can perform an ultrasound early in the pregnancy to examine the thickness of the
cervical tissue. Special Care Pregnancies, supra note 136. A surgical procedure
can successfully treat an incompetent cervix eighty-five percent to ninety
percent of the time. Id. This procedure, called cerclage, is usually performed
when the patient is under spinal or epidural anesthesia and involves closing the
cervix with strong stitches for the full term of the pregnancy. Id. After having
cerclage, a woman is usually prescribed medication to help prevent miscarriage.
Id. The stitches are removed around the ninth month of pregnancy or sooner if
labor commences, to prepare for delivery. Id. In a later pregnancy, Debra Ann
Fahey was able to undergo a cerclage procedure to prevent her from delivering
the fetus prematurely, and she was able to carry her pregnancy until the baby
was healthy enough to survive (although the baby was born six weeks
premature). Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 647.
131
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arguing that the extra operations she had endured as a result of the
negligently monitored labor and delivery constituted a “physical
injury.”138 The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment,139 finding the plaintiff-mother’s “physical injury”
argument without merit140 and her claim for emotional damages
based on personal injury unsupported by her testimony.141
Moreover, the trial court held that so long as Tebbutt provided the
legal framework for prenatal cases, a mother could not recover for
emotional damages resulting from a negligently caused stillbirth
absent proof of her suffering an independent injury.142 Indeed, the
court found “the more reasonable rule to be that which precludes
recovery, not only for the emotional suffering resulting indirectly
from the loss or impairment of the fetus or baby, but also for ‘the
more immediate emotional harm attendant to the mother’s
enduring a negligently caused stillbirth.’” The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s decision.143
In April 2004, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the
lower courts’ orders granting the defendants’ motions for summary
138

Fahey, slip op. at 2. Plaintiff’s arguments were in response to
defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that a plaintiff may not recover for
emotional distress resulting from a negligently caused stillbirth in the “absence
of any independent, causative physical injury to her own person.” Id.
139
Id. at 5.
140
Id. at 2.
141
Id. at 3. The court held:
[P]laintiff’s testimony demonstrates that her primary concern was over
the plight of the babies, [sic] and their condition . . . there is simply
nothing in the record to support a finding that plaintiff suffered any . . .
psychological trauma as a result of her own condition or experiences,
separable from the distress she felt because of the condition or death of
the fetuses.”
Id. (citations omitted).
142
Id. at 5.
143
Fahey, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (holding that the plaintiffs failed to present
evidence that the mother was independently injured beyond those injuries
naturally caused during childbirth, and as such, the cause of action for emotional
distress was properly dismissed because recovery for psychological damages
resulting from the stillbirth was precluded “in view of the present status of the
law”).
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judgment in both Broadnax and Fahey.144 The court addressed the
issue of when, if ever, a mother could recover damages for
emotional distress resulting from a miscarriage or stillbirth caused
by medical malpractice absent a showing of independent physical
injury to the mother.145 The court recognized that precedent
strongly disfavored claims for emotional distress in cases in which
the plaintiffs had suffered no independent physical injuries.146
However, the court noted that applying a strict interpretation of
this rule in cases of negligently caused stillbirths creates a “logical
gap in which the fetus is consigned to a state of ‘juridical
limbo.’”147 Essentially, infants who were injured in utero but
survived could maintain a cause of action for medical malpractice
against tortfeasors after they were born.148 Furthermore, a pregnant
mother could bring a cause of action for her independent
injuries.149 However, neither party had a cause of action if medical
malpractice had caused the pregnancy to terminate in miscarriage
or stillbirth and the mother was not physically injured beyond the
pain and suffering naturally attendant to childbirth.150 The gap
created by precedent resulted in an uncomfortable dichotomy:
medical caregivers faced liability for injuries to fetuses that
survived, but faced no liability for injuries to fetuses that died in
utero.151
In Broadnax, the defendants argued against the permissibility
of claims for emotional damages resulting from the wrongful death
of a fetus, grounding their challenge in the fact that the defendants’
144

Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 647.
Id. at 646.
146
Id. at 648.
147
Id. (citing Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting)).
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. In both Appellate Division decisions, the courts held that the
procedures incident to childbirth, miscarriage, or stillbirth are not considered
independent physical injuries to the mother, and thus, do not allow for a cause of
action for emotional distress. See Broadnax, N.Y.S.2d at 500; Fahey, 758
N.Y.S.2d at 710.
151
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648.
145
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actions, negligent or otherwise, did not violate a duty to the
expectant mothers; rather, the alleged conduct injured only the
fetuses.152 The court dismissed this argument as “tortured”
reasoning.153 The court explained that, given that prenatal medical
providers owe a duty of care to the developing fetus, the providers
would naturally owe a corresponding duty of care to the mother,
who is the primary patient during the entire pregnancy.154 The
court determined the health of the mother and the fetus to be linked
in the unique situation of pregnancy, but in the same breath,
clarified that the fetus and the mother are each owed a duty of
care.155 Thus, in overturning nearly twenty years of precedent, the
court held that, “even in the absence of an independent injury,
medical malpractice resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth should be
construed as a violation of a duty of care to the expectant mother,
entitling her to damages for emotional distress.”156
Broadnax was decided 6-1 in favor of the plaintiff-mothers.157
In the only dissenting opinion, Judge Reed posed the possibility
152

Id.
Id. The “[d]efendants [argue that] their alleged conduct injured only the
fetuses, and, accordingly, they did not violate a duty to the expectant mothers.
Defendants’ reasoning is tortured.” Id.
154
Id. (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951)). In Woods v.
Lancet, the plaintiff-infant sustained serious injuries through the negligent
actions of his mother’s physician, such that he was born permanently impaired
and disabled. Woods, 102 N.E.2d at 691-92. The court held that the infant,
injured in utero and later born alive, had the right to maintain an action for the
alleged negligence causing such injury. Woods, 102 N.E.2d at 695.
155
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648-49. Cf. Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d
1142, 1146 (N.Y. 1985) (Jasen, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Jensen
noted:
The interests of the mother and the unborn child are intertwined by
nature during the mother’s pregnancy. Due to these relationships, a
tortious act, which results in the death of an unborn child, represents a
breach of a direct duty to the mother. Defendant’s infringement upon
the mother’s freedom from mental distress was occasioned by the
breach of a distinct and independent duty flowing to the mother.
Id.
156
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649.
157
Id.
153
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that the decision might expose medical caregivers to additional
liability.158 Of great concern to her was that there was no way, at
the time of the decision, to assess or predict the potential effect of
increased liability on the availability and cost of gynecological and
obstetrical care in New York.159
II. BEYOND BROADNAX
In its indication that a fetus enjoys a legal status independent of
the mother, Broadnax v. Gonzalez stands in stark contrast to New
York’s past jurisprudence regarding actions for the wrongful death
of a fetus. In 1969, the New York Court of Appeals affirmatively
stated in Endresz v. Friedberg that actions for the wrongful death
of a fetus are barred in New York.160 In Endresz, the court
discussed at length the reasons for denying the survivors to fetuses
negligently killed by medical malpractice in utero the right to sue
the physician tortfeasors.161 Broadnax, however—in holding that
the fetus is a separate being, that the fetus need not be born to have
rights, and that the difficulty of calculating damages is not a
justification for barring wrongful death suits—may render the logic
of Endresz invalid. In so doing, Broadnax possesses the potential
to work a significant change in the law regarding fetal rights. The
precise impact of Broadnax is as yet unclear; however, in testing
the boundaries of this new precedent, plaintiffs and the lower
courts may compel the reevaluation of the recovery bar for actions
158

Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 650; See supra note 12.
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 650.
160
Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 902, 907 (N.Y. 1969). The
Endresz court upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s wrongful
death suits and claims for loss of services of the infants, holding that
the fairest and most practical solution . . . the one most in accord with
the dictates of justice, public policy and common sense . . . [is] to leave
the parents of a stillborn fetus, whose death has been caused by a third
party’s wrongful act, to the damages recoverable by them in their own
right and to deny to the distributees any redress by way of a wrongful
death action.
159

Id. at 907.
161
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 903-05.
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grounded in the wrongful death of a fetus. Indeed, only through
clarification by the New York Court of Appeals or the New York
State legislature will stability and predictability come to the law of
torts related to fetal rights.
A. The Unraveling of Endresz: Broadnax’s Implications for
Wrongful Death Law
An action for wrongful death is a lawsuit brought by the
survivors of a decedent whose death resulted from a defendant’s
negligent or wrongful act.162 A majority of jurisdictions today,
with the exception of New York, recognize that a cause of action
lies for the negligently caused death of an unborn child.163 The old
rule,164 which barred actions for the wrongful death of an unborn
child, held that the fetus was not a person for whom recovery could
be made under wrongful death, as the fetus was part of the mother
at the time of the injury.165 This rule was abandoned by most states
162

See supra note 11 and accompanying text. See also 12 AM. JUR. Trials §
317 (2004).
163
James M. Simpson, Growing Recognition of Wrongful Death for
Unborn Children, ADVOCACY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES (Int’l Ass’n of Def.
Counsel, Aug. 2001), reprinted in DEFENSE COUNSEL JOURNAL, Oct. 1, 2001, at
487. The following U.S. jurisdictions either explicitly or implicitly recognize a
wrongful death action for the death of an unborn child by statute, state case law,
or federal case law: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin,
and West Virginia. Id.
164
Simpson, supra note 163 (citing Dietrich v. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep.
242, 138 Mass. 14 (1884)). The rule barring actions for the wrongful death of an
unborn child was promulgated by Oliver Wendell Holmes in Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton in 1884. Id.
165
Simpson, supra note 163 (citing Dietrich v. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep.
242138 Mass. 14 (1884)). This rule is no longer applicable in jurisdictions that
have concluded that unborn children are “persons” within the meaning of the
wrongful death statutes. Simpson, supra note 163. For example, in 2001, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas was asked to reconsider its position in Chatelain v.
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in part because advances in medicine “fundamentally changed the
way the modern mind conceptualizes ‘separateness’ between
mother and child.”166 Nonetheless, New York courts maintain a bar
against actions based on the wrongful death of a fetus dating from
the New York Court of Appeals’s decision in Endresz, which
foreclosed this avenue of relief.167
In Endresz, a pregnant woman was injured in a car accident
negligently caused by another driver.168 The injuries caused to her
and her twin fetuses resulted in the stillbirth of both babies.169 The
plaintiff-parents sued on behalf of the unborn twins for wrongful
death.170 In dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful death,
the court held that when an unborn child is injured through the
wrongful act of a defendant, “liability attaches only upon
fulfillment of the condition that the child be born alive.”171 The
court thus concluded that there was no right of recovery under
New York law by the personal representative of a stillborn fetus
that had died as a result of injuries received while in utero.172
Importantly, although Broadnax expressly declared that there
was no right of recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus,173 the
Kelley, 910 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Ark. 1995), that a viable fetus was not a “person”
within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. Id. In Arkansas v. Jefferson
Hospital Ass’n, 42 S.W.3d 508, 518 (Ark. 2001), the Court noted that their
holding that a fetus was not a person was based on the Arkansas legislature’s
former characterization of the word “person,” which had changed in the context
of criminal law since Chatelain to include unborn children. Simpson, supra note
163. The court noted that the holding in Chatelain that a fetus was not a person
was seriously undermined by legislative change. Id. After Jefferson Hospital,
the Arkansas legislature amended its wrongful death statute to include unborn
children. Id.
166
Simpson, supra note 163.
167
Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969).
168
Id. at 902.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 905.
172
Id. at 907 (denying the distributees of the fetus a cause of action for the
fetus’s wrongful death).
173
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649 n.4. In footnote 4 of the majority opinion,
the court noted that in rejecting Tebbutt, it also recognized that a majority of
jurisdictions permit some form of recovery for negligently caused stillbirths or
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case nonetheless challenges the logic of the arguments asserted in
Endresz in support of a prohibition on such actions.
The first reason advanced in Endresz for barring a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a fetus is that an unborn child is
not a decedent under the wrongful death statute.174 The majority
opinion observed that the law in New York has declined to
attribute the unborn fetus a “legal personality or identity ‘until it
sees the light of day,’”175 and thus, a fetus killed as a result of
medical malpractice could not be legally termed “deceased.”176
However, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in Broadnax that a
mother has a right to sue for emotional damages caused when
medical malpractice results in a miscarriage or stillbirth precisely
because the infant has no such right.177 Additionally, the court
deemed the fetus to be owed a duty of care independent of the
mother.178 By acknowledging that a fetus is owed an independent
duty of care, the Broadnax decision suggests that an unborn fetus
has a legal personality or identity.179 If this is true, then an unborn
miscarriages. The court then proceeded to specifically limit a mother’s recovery
to damages for the emotional distress attending the stillbirth or miscarriage
caused by medical malpractice, and affirmed the holding in Endresz v.
Friedberg barring wrongful death actions under the circumstances of medical
malpractice resulting in stillbirth or miscarriage. Id. The court gives no
reasoning for this statement, other than the implied reasoning of stare decisis in
saying, “[w]e do not depart from our holding in Endresz.” Id.
174
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 903. However, the majority does admit that the
statute is silent on this matter. Id. The majority interpreted the legislative intent
to not have included unborn children within the meaning of the wrongful death
statute based on the case law at the time the Decedent Estate law was written in
1847. Id. The Decedent Estate Law became, without major changes, Section 54.1 of the EPTL. Id.; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (2004).
175
Endresz, 485 N.E.2d at 904.
176
Endresz, 485 N.E.2d at 905 (holding that a “conditional prospective
liability” is created when a fetus is injured through the wrongful acts of the
defendant, and as such, liability for those wrongful acts attaches only if the child
is later born alive).
177
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648.
178
Id.
179
In Endresz, the court noted that the law had never considered an unborn
fetus as having a separate “juridical existence” or a legal personality or identity
unless it was later born, as part of its reasoning that a fetus did not fall within the
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child would fall within New York’s statutory definition of
“deceased.”180 Thus, in light of the court’s holding in Broadnax,
the first reason advanced in Endresz for denying a cause of action
in wrongful death for an unborn fetus is no longer viable.
The second reason articulated for barring causes of action in
wrongful death for infants killed in utero is that a deprivation of
life should not be actionable unless there has first been a birth.181
Yet, the wrongful death statute is designed to compensate the
decedent’s estate for the loss caused by the decedent’s death.182
Given that the Broadnax court found it illogical to permit doctors
to evade liability when their negligence results in the stillbirth or
miscarriage of a fetus,183 it makes little sense to preclude recovery
for wrongful death when a fetus dies in utero. In both cases, the
fetus dies as a result of the negligence of a third party before it is
born, and in both cases, a loss is occasioned by the death of the
decedent.184 If the logic flowing from Broadnax is extended,185 the
parents, as representatives of the decedent (the unborn fetus), must
be permitted a cause of action for wrongful death simply because
the fetus was deprived of life in the first place.
meaning of “person” for the purposes of the wrongful death statute. Endresz,
248 N.E.2d at 904 (citations omitted). However, now the court in Broadnax has
acknowledged that the fetus is owed a duty of care separate from the expectant
mother, in addition to the duty of care owed to the mother. Broadnax, 809
N.E.2d at 648. Thus, through the decision in Broadnax, the law may now
consider an unborn fetus as having a separate “juridical existence” even when
the fetus does not survive through birth.
180
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (2004).
181
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 903.
182
Weisberg v. Layne-New York Co., 517 N.Y.S.2d 304 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) “The policy underlying [New York’s wrongful death statute] is . . . to
compensate the decedent’s estate for loss suffered by his death.” Id. at 306.
183
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648.
184
The commentary to New York’s Pattern Jury Instructions for wrongful
death actions states that “[i]n order to establish a right to a wrongful death
recovery, the plaintiff need only show that he has a reasonable expectation of
support from the decedent and therefore a pecuniary loss.” 1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d §
2:320, at 1565 (2005).
185
The logic flowing from Broadnax is that the mother must be permitted
to bring a cause of action for injury because the fetus itself cannot bring suit.
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648.
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The Broadnax court noted that had the fetus been born, as an
infant it could have sued for its injuries.186 The court also held that
since the fetus was not born, it must be the mother who was
injured; thus, the court conferred upon the mother the right to bring
suit simply because the fetus could not.187 The court’s argument
essentially eliminates the birth requirement for the wrongful death
statute. The wrongful death statute states as a condition of suit that
the cause of action must be one that could have been sued upon
had death not ensued.188 Had the fetus been born but injured in the
womb and survived until at least birth, it could have sued for the
negligent injuries it sustained in the womb.189 However, as the
second prong of Broadnax explains, since those injuries killed the
fetus, the survivors of the fetus must have the right to bring suit
simply because the fetus was could not.190 The very fact that the
fetus was not born, but could have been born, mandates the
existence of a cause of action for wrongful death on behalf of the
fetus’s survivors. Thus, to fulfill the policy reasons behind the
wrongful death statute, the representatives of the unborn fetus must
have a cause of action for wrongful death.
The Endresz court supported its second reason for precluding a
cause of action in wrongful death by stating that “considerations of
justice which mandate the recovery of damages by an infant,
injured in his mother’s womb and born deformed through the
wrong of the third party, are absent where the foetus, deprived of
life while yet unborn, is never faced with the prospect of impaired
mental or physical health.”191 However, as noted, Broadnax
expressly acknowledged that the child in utero is owed a duty of
care by the medical professional treating the expectant mother’s
pregnancy.192 The Broadnax court impliedly held that consigning
the unborn fetus to a state in which it has no rights is an injustice in

186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id.
Id.
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 908 (Burke, J., dissenting).
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648.
Id.
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 903.
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648.
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itself193 that should be resolved by allowing the mother a cause of
action for injuries if the fetus cannot bring suit.194 Thus,
considerations of justice necessitate the recovery of damages by
representatives of the fetus injured and killed in utero simply
because that fetus never had the chance to bring suit in the first
place.
In his dissenting opinion in Endresz, Judge Burke dismissed
the majority’s reliance on birth as a prerequisite for an action in
wrongful death as illogical.195 First, citing language from Woods v.
Lancet, Judge Burke declared that the majority’s reasoning was an
“outmoded, timeworn fiction.”196 He proposed that life, not birth,
should be the criteria by which the court reviews causes of action
in wrongful death.197 Second, Judge Burke relied on an analogous
Wisconsin case, from which he quoted:
If no right of action is allowed, there is a wrong inflicted
for which there is no remedy. Denying a right of action for
negligent acts which produce a stillbirth leads to very
incongruous results. For example, a doctor or midwife
whose negligent acts in delivering a baby produced the
baby’s death would be legally immune from a lawsuit.
However, if they badly injured the child they would be
exposed to liability. Such a rule would produce the absurd
result that an unborn child who was badly injured by the
tortious acts of another, but who was born alive, could
recover while an unborn child, who was more severely
injured and died as the result of the tortious act of another,
could recover nothing.198
Judge Burke’s criticism of this inconsistency is similar to that
raised by the dissent in Tebbutt—that the practitioner who caused a
more serious injury resulting in death would face less liability than
193

Akin to the aforementioned “juridical limbo,” mentioned supra note 19
and accompanying text.
194
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648.
195
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 908 (Burke, J., dissenting).
196
Id. (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951)).
197
Id. at 908.
198
Id. (citing Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14,
20).
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the practitioner who caused a more minor injury that the infant
survived.199 The persuasiveness of Judge Burke’s dissent is given
even more support by the Broadnax court’s express approval of the
judge’s reasoning in its discussion of the rationale for permitting a
cause of action by the mother for emotional damages on behalf of
the fetus.200 Given this logic, it is likely that the second reason
cited in Endresz against permitting a cause of action for wrongful
death, specifically that there has been no birth, also has been
impliedly overruled by Broadnax.
The third reason advanced for prohibiting recovery for the
wrongful death of fetuses negligently killed in utero is that
damages for such injuries are difficult to calculate.201 In addressing
this concern, Judge Burke, in his dissent in Endresz, argued that
the difficulty of calculating damages should not preclude
substantive recovery.202 Specifically, Judge Burke noted that the
majority’s reliance on the argument that causation and damages are
too difficult to calculate had been effectively dismissed by the
court in Woods v. Lancet.203 Indeed, the majority in Woods
asserted that “it is an inadmissible concept that uncertainty of proof
can ever destroy a legal right.”204 Judge Burke noted that this
portion of the Woods holding was cited approvingly by a Kentucky
state court in its refusal to dismiss a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a stillborn fetus based solely on the difficulty of
estimating damages.205 Judge Burke thus concluded that the
199

Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1147-49.
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648 (holding that Tebbutt wrongly “exposed
medical caregivers to malpractice liability for in utero injuries when the fetus
survived, but immunized them against any liability when their malpractice
caused a miscarriage or stillbirth”).
201
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 904 (holding that there are “no elements
whatever upon which a jury could base any conclusion that a pecuniary injury
has been suffered by the plaintiff from the loss of the unborn child”).
202
Id. at 909. Compare Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649, in which the court
dismisses the dissenting judge’s concerns about juries being asked to quantify
the emotional distress that a woman feels upon suffering a miscarriage or
stillbirth.
203
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 909 (citing Woods, 303 N.Y. at 356).
204
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 909.
205
Id. at 909 (citing Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Ky. 1955)).
200
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supposed difficulty of calculating damages should not be used to
justify the denial of causes of action for the wrongful death of a
fetus.206 Furthermore, the Broadnax majority was unconcerned that
damages might be difficult to quantify.207 In addressing the
dissent’s concern that juries would be asked to quantify the
emotional distress experienced by a woman who has suffered a
miscarriage or stillbirth, the majority responded that “no one from
any quarter [had come] forward [during the appellate process] to
support any such concerns.”208 It can be inferred from this
statement that unless interested parties voiced concerns regarding
any difficulties in affixing damages, the Broadnax majority would
not consider such concerns sua sponte. Given the court’s sentiment
that the difficulty of affixing damages does not justify adherence to
Tebbutt, it is possible that the court may also find that the difficulty
of affixing damages does not justify adherence to the principle in
Endresz that wrongful death damages are barred in part because it
would be difficult to calculate damages and causation in a claim
for the wrongful death of a fetus.
The fourth reason cited to preclude recovery for wrongful
death by the personal representative of a stillborn fetus is that the
parents would receive an undeserved windfall.209 The Endresz
court noted that, in a given case, a mother could sue for any
independent physical injuries she suffered and the father could sue
for the loss of services, making any award for wrongful death an
“unmerited bounty . . . [as the award] would constitute not
compensation to the injured but punishment to the wrongdoer.”210
However, this argument is undercut by the existence of cases in
which a mother does not suffer any physical injuries from the
The Mitchell court, citing to Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951), held that
uncertainty of proof, by itself, can never destroy a legal right. Mitchell, 285
S.W.2d at 906. “The questions of causation and reasonable certainty which arise
in these cases are no different in kind from the ones which have arisen in
thousands of other negligence cases decided in this state in the past.” Id.
206
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 909.
207
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 649.
208
Id.
209
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 904.
210
Id.
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stillbirth apart from those normally incident to childbirth.211 In
such cases, prior to the Broadnax decision, if the plaintiff-mothers
did not allege any independent physical injuries, they were barred
from asserting causes of action for emotional damages.212 Notably,
Broadnax has removed this bar to recovery.213 Thus, the Broadnax
decision could influence the fourth Endresz factor in one of two
ways: (1) either the court may look to Broadnax as representative
of a current trend to permit greater recovery on behalf of plaintiffparents, thereby rendering the “unmerited bounty” argument
outdated, or (2) the court could decide that because a mother can
now recover for emotional distress, she should not be permitted to
also recover as the representative of the fetus in a cause of action
for wrongful death, given that the combination of the two damage
awards would constitute an “unmerited bounty.”214
If the reasoning in Endresz is outdated and a majority of other
states recognize a cause of action for wrongful death of a fetus,
why then do the New York courts consistently bar wrongful death
actions on behalf of survivors of fetuses negligently killed in
utero? The fundamental reasoning for barring wrongful death
actions may parallel the reasoning cited by the New York state
courts in barring actions for wrongful life—that the issue is one
best addressed by the legislature, not the court.215
An action for wrongful life is “[a] lawsuit brought by or on
behalf of a child with birth defects, alleging that but for the
defendant doctor’s negligent advice, the parents would have not
conceived the child, or if they had, they would have aborted the
fetus to avoid the pain and suffering resulting from the child’s
congenital defects.”216 New York currently does not permit causes
of action for wrongful life.217 While a parent may recover damages
211

See Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143; see also Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 646.
Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 648.
213
Id.
214
Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 904.
215
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
216
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1607 (7th ed. 1999).
217
Sheppard-Mobley v. King, 778 N.Y.S.2d 98, 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(holding that “[n]o cause of action may be maintained on behalf of an infant
plaintiff for ‘wrongful life,’ i.e., that he or she would never have been born but
212
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for the increased cost of caring for the child until the age of
majority,218 a child is barred from recovering damages for the
extraordinary expenses that the child will incur upon reaching
majority.219 In the landmark case Becker v. Schwartz, the court
cited two reasons for barring claims for wrongful life.220 First, the
court noted that children who bring wrongful life actions have not
suffered any legally cognizable injuries, there being no
“fundamental right . . . to be born as a whole, functional human
being.”221 Second, the court found that damages would be
impossible to compute, there being no way to provide a remedy
that would place the infants in the place they would have occupied
but for the negligence of the defendants because that place would
have been nonexistence.222 These concerns echo those of the
Endresz court regarding claims for wrongful death, specifically
that an unborn child is not a legally cognizable person in the eyes
of the wrongful death statute and that damages for the wrongful
death of a fetus would be too difficult for a jury to calculate.
In Becker, the majority voiced its discomfort with having to
recognize claims for wrongful life, holding that the court was illequipped to calculate damages based on a comparison between life
in an impaired state and non-existence.223 Indeed, the court noted
that “[r]ecognition of so novel a cause of action . . . is best reserved

for the negligence of the defendants”); see also Sample v. Levada, 779 N.Y.S.2d
96, 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813 (N.Y.
1978).
218
1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d 2:280, at 1464. “[P]arents may recover the cost of care
and treatment of a disabled child born because of a negligent failure to test for or
advise the parents of the potential for the birth of such a child . . . [t]his recovery
is limited to the extraordinary expenses incurred . . . prior to the child’s 21st
birthday.” Id. (citations omitted).
219
Alquijay by Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Center, 473 N.E.2d
244, 245 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that an infant does not have a cause of action in
wrongful life because he cannot allege any cognizable injury, there being no
right not to be born over being born impaired).
220
Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 412.
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for legislative, rather than judicial, attention.”224 Although
wrongful death is not a novel cause of action and is recognized in a
majority of states,225 New York continues to reject causes of action
for wrongful death-of-fetus, primarily for reasons that echo its
reasons for rejecting causes of action for wrongful life. Thus,
perhaps as in the case of wrongful life, the cause of action for
wrongful death is also best left to the legislature for a formal
decision. If there is confusion regarding Broadnax’s implications
for wrongful life actions, the legislature could affirmatively
address this issue through an amendment to the wrongful death
statute. State legislatures in South Dakota and Arkansas have
drafted their wrongful death statutes to expressly permit actions on
behalf of survivors of unborn children.226 These codes of these
states could serve as a helpful model if the legislature decides to
properly address the issue of wrongful death actions in New York.
However, just as it has not yet addressed the issue of whether a
cause of action lies for wrongful life, the New York legislature has
stalled in enacting a statute providing that fetuses are persons for
the purpose of the wrongful death statute. In 2003, the New York
State legislature put forward bills in both the State Assembly and
the Senate that, if enacted, would amend the Estates, Powers and
Trusts Law to allow recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus
which dies in the womb through a wrongful act or negligence by a
third party.227 However, these bills have not yet been passed and
remain in the committee stage.228
B. The Application of Broadnax by New York Courts
Broadnax is a fairly recent decision, and thus, New York courts
have not been presented with many occasions in which to apply the
principles articulated in the case. However, three significant lower
224

Id.
Simpson, supra note 163.
226
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62102 (2004).
227
S.B. 135, 226th Ann. Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003); S.A. 5753,
226th Ann. Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
228
Id.
225
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court decisions, Sheppard-Mobley v. King, Shaw v. QC-Medi New
York, Inc., and Stuart v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.,
and the very recent Court of Appeals decision to overturn
Sheppard-Mobley v. King, address the Broadnax ruling directly.229
The outcomes of these cases suggest that the courts are struggling
to deal with the expansion of fetal and maternal rights that resulted
from Broadnax. If nothing else, the four decisions indicate some
disagreement among the courts with regard to how best to apply
Broadnax.
In June 2004, in Sheppard-Mobley, the Appellate Division,
Second Department, extended the principles of Broadnax to the
plaintiff-mother’s claim of emotional distress resulting from the
successful birth of a child negligently injured in utero.230 Finding
no reason to limit the Broadnax holding to cases of stillbirth and
miscarriage, the Appellate Division relied on an analysis of
previous Court of Appeals decisions, including Broadnax, Tebbutt,
and Vaccaro, to demonstrate that the court had “repealed the
independent physical injury requirement for all three categories of
birth trauma.”231 First, the court in Sheppard-Mobley noted the
holding in Broadnax that if there is a duty of care owed to the
infant in utero, then surely there is a duty of care owed to the
expectant mother.232 Second, the court held that, in prohibiting a
mother’s recovery for emotional distress damages in the absence of
an independent injury, it had consistently treated the miscarriage,
stillbirth, or live birth of a fetus in an impaired state alike.233 Thus,
miscarriage, stillbirth, and live birth of a fetus in an impaired state
should be treated alike in allowing a mother’s recovery for
emotional distress damages in the absence of an independent

229

Sheppard-Mobley v. King, 778 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004);
Shaw v. QC-Medi New York, 778 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Stuart
v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., No. 9767/03, slip. op. at 1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005); Sheppard-Mobley v. King, No. 49, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS
1135, (N.Y. App. Div. May 10, 2005).
230
Sheppard-Mobley, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 103-04.
231
Id. at 103.
232
Id.
233
Id.
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injury.234 Finally, the court noted that if Broadnax overruled
Tebbutt, it should also overrule Vaccaro, which denied damages
for emotional distress to the parents of children injured in utero but
born alive.235 Consequently, the court held that recovery for
emotional damages should be permitted when the defendantdoctor’s negligence results in the live birth of a severely impaired
child.236
In addition to the Second Department’s holding that a mother’s
right to recover for emotional distress under Broadnax extends to
cases involving the live birth of a child in an impaired state,237 in
early 2005, the Queens County Supreme Court held that the
retroactive application of both Broadnax and Sheppard-Mobley
was appropriate.238 The decision in Stuart v. New York City Health
and Hospitals Corp. reflected a turning point in New York
jurisprudence marked by Broadnax and Sheppard-Mobley. The
judge noted that Broadnax and Sheppard-Mobley created a “new
rule” that recognized actions for emotional distress absent physical
injury.239 This rule fulfilled the “commendable purpose” of
expanding the duty of care owed to expectant mothers.240 The
court held that this “commendable purpose” was achieved by
retroactive application, since there was no lawful justification for
the old policy, which did not address a mother’s emotional
wellbeing as dependent on the health of her child.241 Thus, the
Stuart decision reinforced Broadnax and Sheppard-Mobley,
comporting with the “spirit and direction” of the Court of
234

Id.
Id.; see also supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text for a summary of
Vaccaro v. Squibb, 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980)).
236
Sheppard-Mobley, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
237
1 N.Y. P.J.I.3d 2:280, at 1463 (2005); Sheppard-Mobley, 778 N.Y.S.2d
at 103.
238
Stuart, No. 9767/03, slip op. at 3. Retroactive application means that a
change in law will be applied to injured parties that filed lawsuits prior to the
change in law, in that they will be allowed to amend their complaint to include a
cause of action for recovery that the new law permits them. Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
235
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Appeals’s decisional law in this area.242
From holdings such as the Second Department’s in SheppardMobley and the Queens County Supreme Court’s in Stuart, it
appeared that the New York courts would progressively expand
upon the holding in Broadnax and go to great lengths to permit
recovery for emotional damages when a defendant-doctor’s
negligence resulted in the live birth of a severely impaired child.
However, in May 2005, the Court of Appeals reexamined
Sheppard-Mobley and overturned the Second Department’s
decision, holding that an expectant mother may not recover
damages for emotional injuries when a defendant-doctor’s
negligence causes injury to a fetus that later survives.243 The court
explained that the holding in Broadnax was intended to “fill a gap”
in tort jurisprudence that had exposed doctors to liability for their
negligence when a fetus was born alive, but immunized them when
the fetus died in the womb.244 Further, the court held that the
Broadnax holding had been crafted to eliminate the injustice
created by ignoring a small, but undoubtedly aggrieved, class of
plaintiffs, and that it was this unique injustice that the court sought
to rectify by permitting mothers, even absent an independent
injury, to recover for emotional distress when medical malpractice
resulted in the stillbirth or miscarriage of the fetuses they were
carrying.245 Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the Second
Department had wrongly applied the principles of Broadnax to the
facts in Sheppard-Mobley because, as the court had held many
years earlier in Woods v. Lancet, a child born alive has a cause of
action for the physical injuries it sustained as a fetus through
medical malpractice.246
242

Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648 (N.Y. 2004). “In
categorically denying recovery to a narrow, but indisputably aggrieved, class of
plaintiffs, Tebbutt is at odds with the spirit and direction of our decisional law in
this area.” Id.
243
Sheppard-Mobley v. King, No. 49, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 1135, at *1-2 (N.Y.
App. Div. May 10, 2005).
244
Id. at *7.
245
Id. at *7.
246
Id. at *7-8 (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691). It is unclear
whether the recent Court of Appeals’ decision in Sheppard-Mobley will impact
the Queens County Supreme Court’s decision in Stuart. Andrew Harris,
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The decision by the Court of Appeals to narrow the scope of
Broadnax provides support for an earlier decision by the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, to narrowly interpret the Broadnax
precedent. Only ten days after Sheppard-Mobley was decided by
the Second Department in June 2004, the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, in Shaw v. QC-Medi New York, refused to
extend Broadnax to the parents’ claims of emotional distress
absent physical injury to the nonpatient plaintiff mother.247 In that
case, the plaintiffs’ baby was born with severe defects requiring
her to be on a ventilator and to receive twenty-four-hour nursing
care.248 The infant’s mother was diabetic and her condition was
aggravated by stress.249 The nursing staff hired by the plaintiffs
was apprised of the mother’s poor health.250 When one of the
nurses failed to adequately respond to an alarm on the infant’s
ventilator, the plaintiff returned home to find her two-year-old
daughter “sweating profusely, very blue, and barely conscious.”251
The child later recovered, but the mother sued for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, arguing that an independent duty
was owed to her by the defendant nurses because they were “on
notice of her condition and the effect that stress had upon it.”252
The court held that, despite the decision in Broadnax to permit
Expanding ‘Broadnax’; Court of Appeals Soon to Rule On Case Used By Suffolk
Judge to Add Emotional Distress Claim to Neo-Natal Malpractice Suit, N.Y.
L.J., May 10, 2005, at 16 (noting, prior to the publication of the Court of
Appeals decision on Sheppard-Mobley, that if the Court of Appeals overturned
the Second Department’s decision in Sheppard-Mobley, the new holding could
“sweep away” the decision in Stuart as well).
247
Shaw v. QC-Medi New York, 778 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
248
Id. The child’s severe defects were not caused by medical malpractice
and are important to the case only in that the defects caused the child to need
twenty-four-hour nursing care and attention.
249
Id.
250
Id. Before the incident in question, the parents in Shaw were frustrated
when their nurses sometimes failed to show up for work. The father wrote a
letter informing the nursing service that his wife’s severe diabetes was being
exacerbated by the stress of the nursing staff’s “lack of professional
commitment,” and that the stress his wife was under was “literally killing her.”
Id.
251
Id. at 792-93.
252
Id. at 793.
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recovery for a mother’s emotional distress resulting from
negligence to her fetus, the duty of care owed to a patient-mother
in pregnancy was unique, and thus, the principles of Broadnax
were not applicable to cases in which the mother was a
nonpatient.253 Thus, it appears for now that the principles of
Broadnax may not extend to instances involving a nonpatient
parent.254
It is clear that the New York courts are in a state of transition
regarding their willingness, or unwillingness, to extend the
principles announced in Broadnax to other situations. The Court of
Appeals’s decision in Sheppard-Mobley strongly suggests that the
holding of Broadnax will be applied very narrowly in the future.
However, Sheppard-Mobley only addresses the potential for a
mother to recover emotional damages for prenatal negligence that
resulted in the birth of an impaired baby. Importantly, the holding
of Broadnax remains valid as applied to other cases affecting the
rights of a fetus and the rights of the mother of a fetus negligently
killed. Thus, the precise repercussions of Broadnax for wrongful
death-of-fetus cases still remain to be seen. As additional cases
percolate up through the New York courts on the issue of maternal
and fetal rights as related to medical malpractice suits, the true
scope of Broadnax hopefully will become clearer.
III. EXPANDING MALPRACTICE LIABILITY IN NEW YORK
The recent New York Court of Appeals decision in Broadnax
v. Gonzalez has the potential to either change or altogether
eliminate the current bars to suits for wrongful death in New
York.255 Regardless of whether the Broadnax decision opens the
door to wrongful death litigation, it almost certainly will impact
the field of obstetrical and gynecological care in New York by
expanding medical malpractice liability.256 This concern was
253

Id. at 795.
In other words, only by reason of pregnancy does a mother, absent
independent injury, have a cause of action for emotional damages for negligence
resulting in harm to her child. Shaw, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
255
See supra Part II.
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highlighted in Judge Reed’s dissent in Broadnax.257 While she
stated that “there is no way . . . to predict . . . the potential effect of
this expansion of liability . . . on the cost and availability of
gynecological and obstetrical services in New York State,”258 it is
a general concern among medical practitioners in New York that
“stifling liability insurance rates could come even closer to
suffocating them” after the Broadnax decision.259 Doctors and
insurance carriers are especially concerned that Broadnax will
result in the filing of an increasing number of lawsuits and, with
“escalating jury awards” and the high costs of defending a lawsuit,
additional lawsuits mean higher liability insurance premiums.260
According to the American Medical Association (AMA), New
York faces a “medical liability insurance crisis that has physicians
retiring early, moving to states where insurance rates are lower and
cutting back on high-risk procedures in an effort to lower insurance
premiums.”261 The AMA reports that New York physicians pay
some of the highest rates of liability insurance in the country, in
the range of up to $200,000 annually.262 Doctors are struggling to
obtain $1 million in malpractice coverage, but jury awards greater
than $1 million are frequent in New York, and the average award
increased from $1.7 million in 1994 to $6 million in 1999.263
Indeed, fear of staggering liability compels many young doctors
not to specialize in obstetrics.264 Further, forty-five percent of the
obstetrical residents who graduated in New York in 2002 have
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since left the state to practice elsewhere.265 In response to these and
other statistics, however, it must be noted that the legislative
director of the New York Public Interest Research Group has
asserted that nowhere is there any independent data proving that
doctors and obstetricians are leaving New York.266
It is possible that the fear of liability has led to a decrease in the
number of obstetricians and an increase in the cost of medical
services available in New York State.267 When there are physician
shortages, fewer obstetricians and gynecologists are available for
routine screenings and checkups.268 Consequently, “women lose
care that helps protect fertility, end pelvic pain, or treat cancer
early . . . [women have to] travel longer distances to find a doctor,
have longer waiting periods for appointments, and have shorter
visits once they get there.”269 Increasing medical liability
disproportionately harms pregnant women because they are unable
to get the prenatal and delivery care they need.270 Furthermore,
obstetric shortages disproportionately impact poor and
disadvantaged women.271 These women frequently rely on
community care clinics, which often have to limit the number of
patients they accept because they cannot shift the costs of their
rising insurance premiums to their uninsured patients.272 Medical
care expenses may also increase when doctors, out of fear of
getting sued, practice what is termed “defensive medicine,” where
they order too many, and sometimes needless, medical tests to
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insulate themselves from future lawsuits.273 It is not difficult to
conclude that with fewer physicians, limited community clinic
services, and defensive medical practices, women in a lower socioeconomic bracket would face significant difficulties in accessing
vital gynecological or obstetrical services.
Some doctors fear that the Broadnax decision could expand
liability, such that that they will end up in court for cases that
involved no medical negligence and face jurors who will award
damages for psychological suffering based not on the degree of
harm or fault, but on the emotionally-charged nature of fetal
malpractice cases.274 The vice-chair of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists expressed concern about the
potential expansion of liability following Broadnax, noting that “if
it were a fair fight, it would not be a problem. But the problem is
that science doesn’t protect us [obstetricians and gynecologists] in
court” when dealing with such emotional issues.275 Similarly,
insurers voice concerns that echo doctors’ concerns. Edward
Amsler, vice president of Medical Liability Mutual Insurance
Company, which insures most of New York’s physicians, noted to
Newsday that children who have been injured through negligence
in utero are very sympathetic plaintiffs and “hence they get huge
jury verdicts.”276
In contrast to doctors’ fears of increased medical malpractice
liability resulting from Broadnax and similar decisions, trial
lawyers doubt whether Broadnax will have any impact on the crisis
of medical malpractice liability facing New York and the rest of
the country; others debate whether there is even a “crisis” at all.277
In one published reaction to Broadnax, Lenore Kramer, past
president of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association,
refuted contentions that Broadnax would increase malpractice
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litigation so as to affect liability rates.278 She declared that the
ruling in Broadnax
recognizes a reality of these terrible situations [of medical
malpractice to fetuses] and brings the law into conformity
with what people’s understanding of what justice is . . .
[trial lawyers] sincerely believe that there is no medical
malpractice crisis and that it is a trumped up issue
perpetrated by the insurers.279
In another published reaction, Margaret C. Jasper, one of the
attorneys representing the appellants in Broadnax, stated that if
doctors are concerned about unjustified lawsuits, they will need to
do a better job of “policing their own.”280 Jasper further explained
that even in clear cases of medical malpractice, it is difficult to
bring a malpractice case in New York due to statutes of limitations
and expert testimony requirements.281 Regardless of its impact on
the medical liability insurance crisis, it is clear that the Broadnax
decision was “heralded by plaintiff’s attorneys as having brought
New York out of the dark ages by expanding the amount of
damages potentially recoverable,”282 with some opining that
Broadnax merely comports with a growing national sentiment that
the unborn child is worthy in the eyes of the law.283 Whether an
increase in the amount of available damages will actually have an
impact on the cost of malpractice liability insurance in New York
is yet to be seen.
There are two specific ways in which the New York State
278
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legislature could address concerns related to the Broadnax
decision. First, the legislature could directly address the cause of
action for wrongful death by statute, either by affirmatively
denying recovery for these causes of action or by expressly
allowing for these causes of action.284 This method goes directly to
the heart of the matter and in fact would determine the impact that
Broadnax will have on fetal rights litigation related to prenatal
negligence.
Alternatively, the legislature could also address the concerns
resulting from Broadnax by regulating medical malpractice
liability itself. Damages caps and insurance reform are often
suggested as two means of stabilizing premium rates for doctors.
Physicians and the insurance industry generally favor the
imposition of caps on non-economic damages in medical
malpractice liability cases as a solution to rising insurance
premiums.285 This method has been supported primarily by
Republican legislators at both the state and federal level.286
California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)
is one such model of damage cap legislation.287 MICRA places a
$250,000 cap on the amount of compensation awarded to
malpractice victims for their non-economic injuries.288 The New
284

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §16-62-102
(2004). South Dakota and Arkansas have statutes that expressly allow for causes
of wrongful death for the fetus negligently killed in utero. Id.
285
Glassman, supra note 260, at 419 (noting that physicians and the
insurance industry place the blame for escalating malpractice liability insurance
rates on an excess of litigation and high jury awards). Non-economic damages
are defined generally as damages awarded for a litigant’s past and/or future pain
and suffering. Id. at 423 n.27.
286
Id. at 419. The GOP’s objective is to impose federal caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases and to take the decision out of
the hands of the states. Id.
287
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 2005); see also Hearings, supra
note 13 (statement to Congress in which the American Medical Association
advocates federal legislation based on California’s medical liability reform act,
known as MICRA).
288
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 2005). Non-economic damages, as
defined in the California statute, include pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, disfigurement and other non-pecuniary injury. Id.
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York legislature could enact a similar cap on non-economic
damages.289 A cap might propel more obstetricians and
gynecologists back into high-risk practices, thus helping to
alleviate the women’s healthcare crisis that might result from the
Broadnax decision. However, opponents to a similar proposal in
the U.S. House of Representatives have stated that
[a cap on non-economic damages in healthcare lawsuits]
offers a “solution” prior to having discovered the root of
the problem. Instead of reducing the occurrence of
frivolous lawsuits, providing direct assistance to health care
providers and communities, and examining every aspect of
this problem [i.e., doctors facing soaring medical
malpractice insurance premiums], this legislation restricts
the legal rights of those who have been truly wronged.290
Insurance reform has been suggested as an alternative means of
reducing or stabilizing doctors’ insurance premium costs.291
Insurance reform is supported primarily by Democratic state and
federal legislators, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America,
state trial lawyer associations, and consumer watchdog groups.292
These groups are critical of federal caps and maintain that caps
have not proven successful in either lowering or stabilizing
premiums.293 Indeed, as noted in a 2003 study released by the
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights on the relative
success of California’s MICRA statute, malpractice caps, and other
restrictions on patients’ rights did not actually lower or stabilize
premiums, as insurers and doctors claimed; rather, it was the
implementation of California’s insurance reform initiative in 1988
that reduced California doctors’ premiums by twenty percent over
three years.294 This law resulted in a rate freeze, a rate rollback,
289
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and stringent regulation that reduced premiums in all lines of
insurance, including medical malpractice.295 Thus, the New York
State legislature might be well advised to adopt insurance reforms
similar to those implemented in California and to require that
insurance companies roll back premium rates to offset any
concerns about the rising costs of medical malpractice insurance in
the aftermath of the Broadnax decision.
Clearly, divergent views exist as to whether Broadnax will
affect the medical liability crisis faced by obstetricians and
gynecologists in New York. Some even question whether a crisis
exists at all. However, even if the crisis is “trumped up,” as some
opine, it is almost certain that the legislature will address the crisis,
or potential crisis, through initiatives that either eliminate possible
causes of action for the wrongful death of fetuses, impose caps on
malpractice verdicts, or enact insurance premium reforms. Thus,
while Broadnax’s impact may be a drop in the bucket in terms of
affecting the availability or cost of obstetrical or gynecological
care in New York, it has almost assuredly contributed to fear that
the availability or cost of obstetrical or gynecological care could be
compromised by expanding liability in the area of wrongful death.
Indeed, this fear may be what spurs the legislators to take action.
CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals’s recent decision in Broadnax
v. Gonzalez overturned nearly twenty years of precedent in which
New York courts refused to permit mothers to recover emotional
damages for negligently caused stillbirths or miscarriages absent
independent injuries of their own. In declaring that both the fetus
and the mother are owed a duty of care, and by expanding the
rights of the fetus by assigning a cause of action to the mother,
Broadnax may have far-reaching implications for other causes of
action involving fetal rights, namely, suits for wrongful death.
While the victims of negligence clearly deserve to have their
295
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injuries redressed, doctors are justifiably concerned that expanding
liability will result in higher insurance premiums, forcing
obstetricians to abandon high-risk patients or even the practice of
obstetrics and gynecology in New York altogether, thereby
lowering the quality of obstetrical and gynecological care provided
in this state. This result would undermine one of the principal
purposes of medical malpractice liability—to encourage
accountability in medicine and to ensure the availability of highquality healthcare. If an increase in the number of malpractice
lawsuits results in an exodus of obstetrical and gynecological
physicians from the medical field, it must be asked whether this
expansion of liability is beneficial for New York in the long run. In
addressing this question, the courts have faced difficult decisions
and have demonstrated a desire to leave the expansion of tort
liability to the legislature. Given the court’s reluctance to address
this area of the law, the legislature must seriously examine the
trend of expanding fetal rights in New York and the United States
generally and take affirmative steps to either expressly accept or
reject the extension of these rights to wrongful death causes of
action. Only with definitive and clear statutes will this murky area
of fetal rights ever be resolved in New York.

